


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THE WHITE HOUSE

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NSC Review Completed.

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March 11, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence


THE HONORABLE EUGENE ROSTOW
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Possible Verification Initiative For a Major
Presidential Address

While no firm commitments have yet been made, we are giving serious consideration to the idea of a major speech during the President's European trip in June. One possible venue for such an event would be Westminster Hall in London, where no major Western leader outside the UK has delivered formal remarks since General de Gaulle's 1960 address. It might also be desirable to consider the German Bundestag as a high-profile "platform" during the President's Bonn visit.

In determining how best to exploit such an opportunity, I wonder if it is feasible to consider incorporating in a speech of that kind some significant arms control verification initiative - a dramatic proposal along the lines of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal in the Fifties. Such an initiative, reflecting both the President's deep commitment to actual arms reductions and the spirit of an open, democratic society, might do much to preserve the high ground for the U.S. in arms control negotiations. At a minimum, it could adulterate the propaganda offensive we can anticipate the Soviets launching on the eve of the President's trip and at the same time provide an eloquent contrast to the political demonstrations likely to be mobilized in the course of his travels, particularly in the Federal Republic.

I would welcome your early views on this subject, particularly the feasibility of the President calling for a package of specific verification measures (e.g., international teams at weapon production plants, on-demand, on-site inspections, aerial surveillance, etc.) directly applicable to our bilateral negotiations on INF and START.



William P. Clark

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